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Private Shotgun DNA Sequencing: A Structured
Approach
Ali Gholami, Mohammad Ali Maddah-Ali, and Seyed Abolfazl Motahari
Abstract—DNA sequencing has faced a huge demand since it
was first introduced as a service to the public. This service is often
offloaded to the sequencing companies who will have access to full
knowledge of individuals’ sequences, a major violation of privacy.
To address this challenge, we propose a solution, which is based
on separating the process of reading the fragments of sequences,
which is done at a sequencing machine, and assembling the reads,
which is done at a trusted local data collector. To confuse the
sequencer, in a pooled sequencing scenario, in which multiple
sequences are going to be sequenced simultaneously, for each
target individual, we add fragments of one non-target individual,
with a known DNA sequence at the data collector. Then coverage
depth of the individuals, defined as the number of DNA fragments
per DNA site, are selected proportional to the powers of two.
This layered structured solution allows us to ensure privacy,
using only one sequencing machine, in contrast to our previous
solution, where we relied on the existence of multiple non-
colluding sequencing machines.
Index Terms—DNA sequencing, shotgun sequencing, privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Functionalities within the human body is coded in the DNA.
The way cells evolve and form different tissues and limbs are
highly correlated to the information stored in the genome.
Human genome is a sequence of nucleotides chosen from
the four member set {A,C,G, T }. The sequence in human
genomes are very similar–more than 98 percent alike. What
is mostly responsible for variations among human genomes
are Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs). In fact, an
individual’s genome can be uniquely characterized by its
SNPs–that is called genotyping.
Having access to the genome sequence can benefit individu-
als for health care purposes both in diagnostic and therapeutic
decision-making procedures [1], [2], [3]. As a result, the
usage of genetic testing services have risen massively in the
past decade [4], [5], as well as genetic testing providers.
As genomic data is becoming a leading part of health care
procedures, concerns involving the privacy and confidentiality
of this data have grown similarly [6], [7], [8]. The disclosure
of this data can be maliciously used for example by insurance
companies to increase the rates for particular diseases and
drugs. Moreover, The disclosure of this information puts the
information on the relatives in danger as well, due to the
inherited similarities between family members [9], [10]. Thus,
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accessing genomic data in one hand is useful in curing diseases
and on the other hand its disclosure is a violation to the privacy
of individuals [11]–[14]. There are a lot of papers addressing
the issue of privacy in data exploration for genomic data.
Some have used the concept of k-anonymity for providing
data privacy, some have used differential privacy and others
provided solutions by cryptographic methods [15]–[23]. The
objective in all those papers was to make sure no one’data is
revealed in a published data set due to the process of sharing
data for research purposes. In this paper, we have looked into
the issue of privacy in a different way. The privacy is violated
at the beginning of sequencing process, due to the access of
the sequencing company to the sequence. Therefore, before
we even disclose our data, the company knows our sequence.
The most popular method in sequencing the whole genome
is shotgun DNA sequencing [24], [25], [26]. In this method,
the genome is broken into multiple fragments with various
lengths. After that, a sequencing machine reads these frag-
ments are assembles the reads to build the whole sequence.
Assembling algorithms available let the sequencing procedure
to be both cost and time effective. It takes just a couple of days
with a cost of less than 1000 dollars to sequence the genome,
thanks to the existing sequencing machines. Also, to further
reduce the costs and time, pooled sequencing can be used
[27], [28], [29]. In this methodology, rather than sequencing
one individual, the genomes of a set of individuals are pooled
together and sent to the sequencer. This will reduce the cost in
comparison to the case in which these individuals sequenced
the genome separately. Also, as wii be seen later on, the usage
of pooled sequencing will benefit us in providing the privacy
constraint.
Taking a deep look at the sequencing procedure, we realized
that the sequencing process is itself a source of leakage
for the sequence information. In this paper we introduce
a scheme in which sequencing is possible while this kind
of leakage is prevented and we will guarantee this privacy
mathematically. In fact, we are going to sequence the genome
of a set of individuals, using a sequencing machine, while
limiting the knowledge received by the sequencer as desired.
We first mention that the sequencing process consists of two
phases. First is the reading phase in which the sequencer
reads the received fragments; i.e. determines the sequence of
nucleotides in each fragment. Second is the processing phase
where a machine called data collector, using the received
reads, assembles the sequence of each individual. We aim at
separating the two phases to provide privacy. In fact, we will
introduce a methodology in which the sequencer is unable
to do the processing phase while the data collector has the
2ability. In other words, the reading phase which needs high
tech machines is outsourced, and the processing phase which is
computational is done on a trusted local machine. To separate
the two phases, we should make sure the data collector has
more information in comparison to the sequencer. One of the
ideas used in that direction is the usage of a set of individuals
which their genome sequence is known a–priori to the data
collector and unknown to the sequencer. the other idea is to
use the finite field addition. Briefly, if we have two binary
random variables and one of them has a uniform distribution,
their summation in binary field reveals no new information
of the non-uniform random variable; i.e. having the output
of this summation, does not change the distribution of the
random variable in comparison to the prior distribution. With
these two ideas, we are going to limit the information leakage
at the sequencer as desired, while letting the data collector to
reconstruct the sequences.
This problem is conceptually connected to the Shamir
sharing scheme [30]. In this scheme, a secret is partitioned
to multiple parts, and each part is stored in a data base. This
partition is done in such a way that with a subset of the data
bases, the secret is reconstructed. In fact there is a threshold for
the number of data bases where any subset with the number of
data bases equal or more than that, can reconstruct the secret,
and any subset with the number of data bases less than that
threshold, receives no information about the secret [31]. Based
on this solution, there are many works providing solutions
[32], [33].
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The problem
setting is provided in Section II. In Section III, an achievable
scheme is introduced with the corresponding results. In Section
IV, a generalized version of the scheme is introduced with the
resulting theorems and Section V concludes the paper and
introduces some future steps.
II. PROBLEM SETTING
We propose an architecture in which there is a trusted data
collector and a sequencing machine (i.e. sequencer). also,
there is a set of individuals that want their genome to be
sequenced privately, without leaking the sequence data to the
sequencer. There are M ∈ N individuals in this set and they
are labeled from 0 toM−1. The data collector has the duty to
gather the genomes of the individuals in the set and pool their
fragments (the genome is sheared to fragments with various
sizes) together and send this pool to the sequencer. Then,
the sequencer will read these fragments (reading phase) and
reports the resulting reads to the data collector. At last, the data
collector, using the set of reads, assembles the sequences for all
individuals (processing phase) and reports the results to them.
To provide privacy, unlike conventional methods, we aimed
at separating the reading phase with the processing phase. In
fact, the sequencer has the duty to do the reading phase and the
data collector is used for the processing phase. Our objective
for privacy is to guarantee that the processing phase can not
be done in the sequencer.
To separate the two phases, we should create an information
gap between the sequencer and the data collector. To do this,
we use another set of individuals which their sequences are
known before hand to the data collector but unknown to the
sequencer. The genomes of this set of individuals are also
collected by the data collector and their fragments are added
to the pool. This set is of size K ∈ N and the individuals are
labeled from 0 to K−1 and are called known individuals. The
previous set, which the aim is to sequence their genomes, are
called unknown individuals.
We referred to SNPs earlier as the main source of difference
between human genomes. Although there are four types of
nucleotides, two of them can occur in every SNP position for
all individuals, and this binary set in every position is known
a–priori for the population. Also, for each SNP position,
the allele occurring with more frequency in the population
is called the major allele and the one occurring with less
frequency is called the minor allele. Considering this, the
sequence of every individual can be characterized by a vector
in {0, 1}N where N ∈ N is the total number of SNPs and
0 and 1 represent the minor and major alleles, respectively.
Moreover, we define the matrix X which contains the random
variable Xm,n ∈ {0, 1} in its row m and column n that
indicates the allele for unknown individual m in SNP position
n. Similarly, the matrixY is defined for the known individuals.
Keep in mind that the entries in X are unknown both at the
sequencer and the data collector, but the entries in Y are
unknown to the sequencer and known to the data collector,
leading to an information gap between these two.
Let Fm,n and F˜k,n denote the set of fragments containing
SNP position n ∈ N for the unknown individualm and known
individual k respectively. The data collector sends the set of
fragments
M⋃
m=1
N⋃
n=1
Fm,n+
K⋃
k=1
N⋃
n=1
F˜k,n to the sequencer (see
Fig. 1). Let us define the random variables αm,n , |Fm,n| and
α˜k,n , |F˜k,n| as the coverage depth for SNP position n for the
unknown individual m and known individual k, respectively.
Note that in the sequencing process, from each individual,
there are a number of genomes provided for the data collector,
so for most regions in the genome for one individual, there are
multiple fragments containing the region. The sequencer reads
each SNP with a probability of error. As will be seen later, to
lower the effect of reading error caused by the sequencer, we
should increase the coverage depth. The set of reads sent to
the data collector by the sequencer is denoted by R.
Sequencers have errors in reading bases. The probability
of error in reading a SNP in a fragment is assumed to be
constant across all sequences and for all SNPs and is denoted
by η ∈ (0, 1). More precisely, in the sequencer, for a fragment
of an individual, and in a SNP, the probability that a 1 is read 0
or vice versa is η, independent of the individual, the fragment,
and the SNP.
Having Y as a side-information, the data collector maps R
to the matrix Xˆ ∈ {0, 1}M×N using a function φ, i.e.
Xˆ = φ (Y,R) ,
where Xˆ refers to an estimate of the matrix of SNPs for
unknown individuals (X).
The proposed scheme should be such that the following two
conditions are satisfied:
3Seq.
D. C.
U. Ind. 1 · · · U. Ind. M K. Ind. 1 · · · K. Ind. K
Fig. 1. The block diagram of the proposed scheme in stage 1. First, the
fragments of some individuals (known and unknown) are collected by the
data collector, then they are pooled and sent to the sequencers.
Seq.
D. C.
U. Ind. 1 U. Ind. 2 · · · U. Ind. M
Sequence information
of known individuals
Fig. 2. In stage 2, each sequencer sends the results of the reads to the data
collector and then using the information of the known individuals, it will
process the data and assemble the sequences of the unknown individuals.
• Reconstruction Condition: Let xn and xˆn denote the
column n of the matrix X and Xˆ respectively. The re-
construction condition requires that the inequality below
hold for any given ǫ ∈ (0, 1):
P(xˆn 6= xn) ≤ ǫ, ∀n ∈ [N ]. (1)
ǫ is referred to as the accuracy level and is a design
parameter.
• Privacy Condition: For privacy to be held, we want the
distribution of Xm,n,m ∈ [0 : M − 1], n ∈ [N ] remains
almost the same before and after reading the fragments.
To be precise, the privacy condition requires that the
following inequality hold for any given β ∈ (0, 1):
I (Xm,n,m ∈ [0 : M − 1], n ∈ [N ];R)
MN
≤ β. (2)
β is referred to as the privacy level and is a design
parameter.
In the following section we will introduce a proposed
scheme that satisfies the two conditions simultaneously.
III. STRUCTURED ACHIEVABLE SCHEME WITH CONSTANT
COVERAGE DEPTH
In this section, we propose a scheme to satisfy both the
reconstruction (1) and privacy (2) constraints. We have two
assumptions in our scheme:
• Assumption 1: Every fragment is short enough to contain
no more than one SNP.
• Assumption 2: Every fragment is long enough that can
be correctly mapped to the reference genome, i.e. we can
identify exactly from what region of the genome sequence
they came from.
These two assumptions are realistic. We should keep in
mind that there are approximately 3.3 million SNPs in the
human genome. Comparing to the 3 billion length of the
whole genome, it is concluded that the average distance
between two SNPs is roughly 1000 base pairs [34]. Moreover,
using short read alignment algorithms like Bowtie [35], it is
possible to assemble reads of length in the order of a couple
of hundreds. Thus using such algorithms, and choosing the
fragments lengths to be about few hundreds, both assumptions
are valid simultaneously.
In the proposed achievable scheme, we focus on the case
where S = M . In cases where M is greater than S, we
partition the set of individuals into groups of size S and
use this scheme for each group separately. In this paper,
we propose a specific assignment scheme for the coverage
depth parameters. In the proposed solution, named structured
scheme, for ∀m ∈ [0 : M−1], ∀k ∈ [0 : K−1], and ∀n ∈ [N ]
we have
αm,n = 2
mα0, (3)
and
α˜k,n = 2
kα0. (4)
where α0 ∈ N. Also, entries in X have prior probabilities
following the major allele frequencies and entries in Y have
uniform prior probabilities.
Keeping the coverage depth variables exactly as introduced
in the above equations is practically impossible. They are
actually random variables. Analyzing the random case is rather
complicated. To have a better understanding of the problem
and make the analysis tractable, in this section, we consider
the constant case and later in Section Blah, we generalize the
results to the case of random coverage depths.
First, we introduce the main results. Then we derive the
mathematical models in the data collector and the sequencers
in Subsections III-A and III-B, respectively. We rely on these
models to prove the main results in Subsections III-C and
III-D. At last, we discuss the results in Subsection III-E.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for
the reconstruction condition to hold.
Theorem 1. In the structured scheme with constant coverage
depth and reading probability of error of η, the reconstruction
condition (1) is satisfied if
α0
2M+1 − 2 ≥
8η(1− η)
(1 − 2η)2 ln
(
1
ǫ
)
. (5)
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for
the privacy condition to hold.
4Theorem 2. In the structured scheme with constant coverage
depth, the privacy condition (2) is satisfied if
M ≥ 1
β
. (6)
The main message of these results is that we can choose the
parameters of the proposed scheme such that both conditions
are satisfied, simultaneously. In other words, these theorems
confirm that the separation of the reading phase and the
processing phase together with adding known individuals and
by adjusting coverage depths, offers enough flexibility to
satisfy both conditions at the same time; based on (6), M
is chosen, and using (5), α0 is set.
Example 1. If we assume the values η = ǫ = β = 0.01, then
based on Theorem 2, we can have M ≥ 100 and based on
Theorem 1 for M = 100, α0 ≃ 9.6× 1029 (or greater). Also
for η = ǫ = β = 0.1, we get M = 10 and α0 ≃ 5300. For
another example if we assume the values η = 0.01, ǫ = 0.001,
and β = 0.1, we will have M = 10 and α0 ≃ 1166. ♦
A. Mathematical Model in Data Collector in the Structured
Scheme
For any SNP position n ∈ [N ], the data collector should be
able to estimate the vector xn = [X0,n, X1,n, · · · , XM−1,n].
In this subsection, we seek for the model that the data
collector observes in SNP position n. We will show that the
data collector receives Gn as
Gn =
M−1∑
m=0
2mXm,n + Zn, (7)
in which Zn ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
where
σ2 ,
2M+1 − 2
α0
η(1− η)
(1− 2η)2 . (8)
To obtain this model, we should keep in mind that the
fragments have no tags and the data collector and sequencer
both do not know the corresponding individual which every
fragment belongs to. Therefore, when the data collector re-
ceives the read fragments from sequencer, the only information
it gets is the number of major (or minor) alleles in every
position n ∈ [1 : N ]. Consequently, the data collector receives
the following summation
M−1∑
m=0
2mα∑
i=1
(
X˜m,n,i + Y˜m,n,i
)
, (9)
in which X˜m,n,i and Y˜m,n,i are noisy versions of Xm,n
and Ym,n respectively, due to the reading error caused by
the sequencer. Also, recall that the data collector knows the
sequence of known individuals a priori, i.e. it knows the value
for all Ym,n. Let us assume these values are Ym,n = yk,n.
Therefore we have
X˜m,n,i =
{
Xm,n, w.p. 1− η
1−Xm,n, w.p. η, (10)
Y˜m,n,i =
{
ym,n, w.p. 1− η
1− ym,n, w.p. η. (11)
Note that the i index refers to the read number. After scal-
ing (9) and subtracting
∑M−1
k=0 yk,n and 2
M+1 η
1−2η , (9) can
be written as
Gn =
1
α0(1− 2η)
(
M−1∑
m=0
2mα0∑
i=1
(
X˜m,n,i + Y˜m,n,i
))
−
M−1∑
k=0
yk,n − 2M+1 η
1− 2η . (12)
Note that subtracting
∑M−1
k=0 yk,n in the above equation is fine,
because of the full knowledge of matrix Y is available at the
data collector.
To follow, we derive the parameters of the random variable
X˜m,n,i on the condition of knowing Xm,n. Based on (10) we
have
E
(
X˜m,n,i|Xm,n
)
= Xm,n(1 − η) + (1 −Xm,n)η
= (1− 2η)Xm,n + η (13)
Var
(
X˜m,n,i|Xm,n
)
= E
((
X˜m,n,i
)2
|Xm,n
)
−
(
E
(
X˜m,n,i|Xm,n
))2
=
(
X2m,n(1− η) + (1−Xm,n)2 (η)
)
− ((1− 2η)Xm,n + η)2
= η(1− η), (14)
in which the last inequality is valid for both possible values
of Xm,n; i.e. 0 and 1. Using the MMSE estimate and orthog-
onality principle, we can write
X˜m,n,i = (1− 2η)Xm,n + η + Zm,n,i, (15)
where Zm,n,i is a random variable with E(Zm,n,i) = 0
and Var(Zm,n,i) = η(1 − η). Also Zm,n,i and Xm,n are
uncorrelated. Consequently
1
α0(1− 2η)
2mα0∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i = 2
mXm,n +
2mη
1− 2η +
∑2mα0
i=1 Zm,n,i
α0(1− 2η) .
(16)
Based on central limit theorem
∑α0
i=1
Zm,n,i√
α0
converges in dis-
tribution to a normal distribution with zero mean and variance
η(1− η). Thus∑α0
i=1 Zm,n,i
α0(1 − 2η) =
1√
α0(1 − 2η)
∑α0
i=1 Zm,n,i√
α0
(17)
converges in distribution to a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance
η(1−η)
α0(1−2η)2 . Thus, the last term in the right-
hand side of (16) converges to a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance 2mη(1−η). Similarly Using (11), we reach
a similar equation.
Consequently, using (16), we can rewrite (12) as (7).
B. Mathematical Model in Sequencer in Structured Scheme
Similar to the previous subsection, the sequencer receives
the following summation in (9). The difference here with the
5previous subsection is that all individuals are unknown form
the sequencer’s view point. Therefore,
Y˜k,n,i =
{
Yk,n, w.p. 1− η
1− Yk,n, w.p. η. (18)
Yet, X˜m,n,i follows (10).
Scaling the summation in (9), the sequencer receives qn
defined as
qn ,
1
α0(1 − 2η)
(
M−1∑
m=0
2mα0∑
i=1
(
X˜m,n,i + Y˜m,n,i
))
(19)
Taking similar steps as in the previous subsection, qn is
written as
qn =
M−1∑
m=0
2m(Xm,n + Ym,n) + Z˜n, (20)
where Z˜n ∼ N
(
0, σ2
)
in which σ2 is defined in (8).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Having reached the mathematical model in the data collector
in (7), we provide the proof of theorem 1.
Proof. Note that the value of the summation
∑M−1
m=0 2
mXm,n
uniquely matches to a xn (in binary representation of it,
each entry corresponds to a Xm,n for different values of m).
Therefore, our objective is to find the summation above. The
probability of error in estimating the summation, based on (7),
is simply upper bounded by
P(error) ≤ Q
(
dmin
2σ
)
. (21)
Obviously, here dmin = 1 due to the fact that Xm,ns are chosen
from the set {0, 1}. Thus
P(error) ≤ Q
(
1
2σ
)
≤ exp
( −1
8σ2
)
, (22)
in which σ2 is defined in (8).
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Using the mathematical model in (20), we are ready to
provide the proof of theorem 2.
Proof. The fact is that for the sequencers, R is equivalent to
qn, ∀n ∈ [N ] because fragments contain just one SNP and are
grouped based on their containing SNP position and in the
group containing SNP position n, the information is stored in
qn. Thus we have
P (X|R) =
N∏
n=1
P (xn|qn) . (23)
Recall that xn, ∀n ∈ [N ] denotes the column n of X. Due to
independence of entries in X, we have
P(X) =
N∏
n=1
P(xn). (24)
Based on the last two equalities
I (X;R) =
N∑
n=1
I (xn; qn) . (25)
Thus, for privacy condition (2) to be satisfied, it is sufficient
for every n ∈ [N ] to have
I (xn; qn)
M
≤ β. (26)
To begin, we define Zn as
Zn ,
M−1∑
m=0
2m(Xm,n + Ym,n) (27)
It is concluded that the following Markov chain holds,
xn → Zn → qn (28)
Thus we have
I(xn; qn) ≤ I(xn;Zn). (29)
In what follows, we seek for I(xn;Zn). We have
I(X0,n, · · · , XM−1,n;Zn) = H(Zn)
−H(Zn|X0,n, · · · , XM−1,n).
(30)
We expand Zn in binary formation
Zn = (BM,nbM−1,n · · · b0,n)2. (31)
Consequently, the following equations hold
X0,n + Y0,n = 2B1,n + b0,n, (32)
X1,n + Y1,n +B1,n = 2B2,n + b1,n, (33)
...
XM−1,n + YM−1,n +BM−1,n = 2BM,n + bM−1,n, (34)
in which in equation i, Bi+1 is the carry over of the left-hand
summation in binary field. Equivalently we have
b0,n = X0,n ⊕ Y0,n, (35)
b1,n = X1,n ⊕ Y1,n ⊕B1,n, (36)
...
bM−1,n = XM−1,n ⊕ YM−1,n ⊕BM−1,n. (37)
(31) yields
H(Zn) = H(BM,nbM−1,n · · · b0,n). (38)
We expand the right hand side of the above equality as
H(BM,nbM−1,n · · · b0,n) = H(b0,n) +H(b1,n|b0,n)
+ · · ·+H(BM,n|bM−1,n · · · b0,n).
(39)
Based on (35) and the fact that entries ofY have uniform prior
probabilities, b0,n has uniform distribution, so H(b0,n) = 1.
For H(b1,n|b0,n) we have
H(b1,n|b0,n) ≥ H(b1,n|b0,n, B1,n) (a)= H(b1,n|B1,n)
(b)
= H(X1,n ⊕ Y1,n),
(40)
6which also results in 1. Note that (a) is resulted from the fact
that B1,n is sufficient statistic for b1,n. Also (b) is resulted
from (36). Similarly, all the terms in (39) result to 1 except
the last term. Therefore,
H(Zn) = H(BM,nbM−1,n · · · b0,n)
=M +H(BM,n|bM−1,n · · · b0,n). (41)
Based on (27), for the second term in the right hand side
of (30) we have
H(Zn|X0,n, · · · , XM−1,n) = H
(
M−1∑
m=0
2mYm,n
)
=
M−1∑
m=0
H(Ym,n) =
M−1∑
m=0
1 = M.
(42)
Using the last two equalities and (30), we have
I(xn;Zn) = H(BM,n|bM−1,n · · · b0,n) ≤ 1. (43)
The proof is complete.
E. Discussion
As it is seen from theorem 1, the minimum α0 needed
to preserve the reconstruction condition, behaves exponential
with M . α0 is a noise-resistance parameter and as it becomes
larger, the ratio of the fragments containing false reads con-
centrate to the probability of error in the reading phase (η);
that is why increasing α0 helps to eliminate the noise term
in (7).
Taking a deeper look at the procedure in the proof of
Theorem 2, we realize that we have created the binary field
addition in our scheme, as was desired. The bits bi,n that
derive form (35) to (37), are the result of binary field addition.
The addition is for two random variables where one of them
has uniform distribution, Yi,n, and the other, Xi,n,follows the
distribution of SNP position n. If the value of bi,n is given
alone, the results reveals no new information about Xi,n.
Thus these bits alone, are not leaking any information. So
we have created this kind of addition, thanks to adjusting the
coverage depth values. From (7) it is concluded that the only
bit leaking information in position n is BM,n which means
the binary field addition scheme is not working perfectly, but
we should remember that the problem addressed in this paper
has its limitations that we should adapt to. Interestingly, the
maximum entropy of this bit is 1 and this upper bound on
the information leakage is independent of M . This aspect is
very interesting and useful and results the average information
leakage per bit to be at most 1
M
. Therefore by increasing M ,
this average decreases, so we can adjust M so that we reach
the desired β. Note that based on our simulations, I(xn;Zn) =
H(BM,n|bM−1,n · · · b0,n) is an increasing function of M (see
Figure 3) and tends to an ultimate value. So by increasing M ,
the information leakage per bit decreases with the rate of 1
M
,
not more.
M
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n
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M
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Fig. 3. As seen in this figure, I(xn;Zn) is an increasing function with
increasing M .
IV. STRUCTURED ACHIEVABLE SCHEME WITH RANDOM
COVERAGE DEPTH
In the previous section, we analyzed the problem for con-
stant coverage depth; however, it is not a practical case because
we do not have exact control on the number of fragments. In
this section, we consider a more general case in which the
coverage depth parameters are random variables. We assume
them to be binomial variables and approximate them with nor-
mal distribution. Therefore, for ∀n ∈ [N ], ∀m ∈ [0 : M − 1],
we have
αm,n ∼ N
(
2mα0, 2
mσ2α
)
. (44)
Similarly for ∀n ∈ [N ], ∀k ∈ [0 : K − 1], we have
α˜k,n ∼ N
(
2kα0, 2
kσ2α
)
. (45)
Due to the fact that coverage depths mostly have large values,
we assumed that α0 ∈ N.
As the previous section, we introduce the results hereunder.
After that, the mathematical model and the estimation rule are
introduced in Subsections IV-A and IV-B. Then, the proof of
Theorem 3 is provided in Subsection IV-C. Following them,
we discuss the results in Subsection IV-D.
The following theorem provides a sufficient condition to
satisfy the reconstruction condition.
Theorem 3. In the all-but-one scheme, the reconstruction
condition (1) is satisfied if:
α0 ≥ max{e1, e2}, (46)
where
e1 ,
16η(1− η)
(1− 2η)2
(
2M+1 − 2) ln(1
ǫ
)
, (47)
and
e2 ,
√
16σ2α
(
1 +
η2
(1 − 2η)2
)
(2M+1 − 2) ln
(
1
ǫ
)
. (48)
7Remark 1: For the privacy condition, Theorem 2 is valid
here as well. This will be discussed later in Subsection ??.
A. Mathematical Model in Data Collector in the Structured
Scheme
In this subsection, we will show that the information the
data collector receives is the value in Gn which is written as
Gn =
M−1∑
m=0
(2m + δm,n)Xm,n
+
M−1∑
k=0
(
2k + δ˜k,n
)
yk,n + Zn (49)
where δm,n and δ˜k,n are normal random variables with zero
mean and variance 2mσ21 and 2
kσ21 respectively, where
σ21 ,
σ2α
α20
. (50)
Also, Zn ∼ N (0, σ2) where
σ2 ,
2M+1 − 2
(1 − 2η)2
(
η(1− η)
α0
+ η2σ21
)
. (51)
In the pooled sequencing scenario, the sequencer will re-
ceive Gn, which is defined as
Gn =
1
α0(1− 2η)
(
M−1∑
m=0
αm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i
)
+
1
α0(1 − 2η)

M−1∑
k=0
α˜k,n∑
i=1
Y˜k,n,i


−
(
2M+1 − 2) η
1− 2η . (52)
Consider the random variable
∑αm,n
i=1 X˜m,n,i conditioned
on Xm,n. We have
αm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i =
2mα0∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i
+
αm,n∑
i=2mα0+1
X˜m,n,i. (53)
It is trivial that the random variables
∑2mα0
i=1 X˜m,n,i and∑αm,n
i=2mα0+1
X˜m,n,i are independent conditioned on Xm,n.
Also, the distribution of
∑αm,n
i=2mα0+1
X˜m,n,i resembles that
of
∑αm,n−2mα0
i=1 X˜m,n,i both conditioned on Xm,n.
We define
ξm,n , αm,n − 2mα0. (54)
Thus we have E (ξm,n) = 0 and
Var (ξm,n) = Var (αm,n) = σ
2
α. (55)
Similar to the steps taken in Subsection III-A and as a result
of the central limit theorem and orthogonality principle
1
α0
2mα0∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i conditioned on Xm,n
∼ N
(
2m ((1− 2η)Xm,n + η) , 2
mη(1− η)
α0
)
. (56)
For the second term in (53) we have
E

 1
α0
ξm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i | Xm,n


= Eξm,nE

 1
α¯
ξm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i | Xm,n, ξm,n


= Eξm,n
(
1
α0
ξm,n ((1− 2η)Xm,n + η)
)
= 0. (57)
Using the law of total variance we have
Var

 1
α0
ξm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i | Xm,n


= Eξm,n

Var

 1
α0
ξm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i | Xm,n, ξm,n




+ Varξm,n

E

 1
α0
ξm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i | Xm,n, ξm,n




(a)
= Varξm,n
(
1
α0
ξm,n ((1− 2η)Xm,n + η)
)
=
((1 − 2η)Xm,n + η)2
(α0)2
Varξm,n (ξm,n)
=
((1 − 2η)Xm,n + η)2
(α0)2
σ2α. (58)
where (a) results from the fact that E (ξm,n) = 0. Based
on (58), (57), (56), (53) and due to the MMSE rule and the
orthogonality theorem we have
1
α0(1− 2η)
αm,n∑
i=1
X˜m,n,i =
αm,n
α0
(
Xm,n +
η
1− 2η
)
+ Zm,n,
(59)
where Zm,n ∼ N
(
0, 2
mη(1−η)
α0(1−2η)2
)
. Using the same steps, for
the data collector we have
1
α0(1 − 2η)
α˜k,n∑
i=1
Y˜k,n,i =
α˜k,n
α0
(
yk,n +
η
1− 2η
)
+ Z˜k,n,
(60)
where Z˜k,n ∼ N
(
0, 2
kη(1−η)
α0(1−2η)2
)
.
8Therefore using (59) and (60), (52) can be written as
Gn =
M−1∑
m=0
αm,n
α0
(
Xm,n +
η
1− 2η
)
+
M−1∑
k=0
α˜k,n
α0
(
yk,n +
η
1− 2η
)
−
(
2M+1 − 2) η
1− 2η + Z
′
n, (61)
where
Z ′n ,
M−1∑
m=0
(
Zm,n + Z˜m,n
)
. (62)
Thus
Z ′n ∼ N
(
0,
2M+1 − 2
α0
η(1− η)
(1− 2η)2
)
(63)
For the fraction
αm,n
α0
we can write it as
αm,n
α0
= 2m +
ζm,n
α0
, (64)
where
ζm,n , αm,n − 2mα0. (65)
Therefore Var(ζm,n) = Var (αm,n) and for δm,n ,
ζm,n
α0
we
have
Var (δm,n) =
Var (αm,n)
(α0)2
= 2mσ21 . (66)
Also, δ˜k,n is defined similarly. Using (61), (64), and (66), (49)
is resulted from (52)
B. Estimation Rule
For any SNP position n ∈ [N ], the objective for
the data collector is to estimate the vector xn =
[X1,n, X2,n, · · · , XM,n]T . We define the extended vector
x˜n , [X1,n, · · · , XM,n, y1,n, · · · , yK,n]T , where the last K
entries are known to the data collector. Therefore, for the data
collector, estimating x˜n is equivalent to estimating xn.
In this section, our objective is to find the rule that should
be used by the data collector to estimate x˜n. Using the ML
rule, the estimate ˆ˜xn is obtained by
ˆ˜xn = argmax
x˜n
P(Gn | x˜n)
= argmax
x˜n
P
(
Gn −
M−1∑
m=0
2m(Xm,n + ym,n) | x˜n
)
,
(67)
Let
Vn , Gn −
M−1∑
m=0
2m(Xm,n + ym,n). (68)
Based on (49),
Vn conditioned on x˜n ∼ N
(
0, (2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2
)
. (69)
Therefore,
ˆ˜xn = argmin
x˜n
|Vn|. (70)
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Based on the mathematical model and estimation rule
presented in the previous subsections, we are ready to provide
the proof of theorem 3.
Proof. Similar to the proof presented in subsection III-C
and based on the estimation rule in (70), our estimation
resembles an AWGN channel. In other words, if we estimate∑M−1
m=0 2
m(Xm,n + ym,n), then ˆ˜xn is resulted accordingly.
Thus, for the probability of error we have
P(error) ≤ Q
(
1
2
√
(2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2
)
≤ exp
( −1
8 ((2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2)
)
. (71)
Putting the right-hand side less than ǫ results
(2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2 ≤
1
8 ln
(
1
ǫ
) . (72)
Rewriting the left-hand side by substituting σ21 results
(2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2 =
2M+1 − 2
(1− 2η)2
(
η(1− η)
α0
+ (η2 + (1 − 2η)2)σ21
)
. (73)
In order (72) to hold, it is sufficient for both two terms in the
right-hand side of the above equality to be less than 1
16 ln( 1ǫ )
.
From the first inequality we have
α0 ≥ 16η(1− η)
(1 − 2η)2
(
2M+1 − 2) ln(1
ǫ
)
. (74)
From the second one we reach
α0 ≥
√
16σ2α
(
1 +
η2
(1− 2η)2
)
(2M+1 − 2) ln
(
1
ǫ
)
. (75)
As both inequalities above should hold, the theorem is proven.
D. Discussion
First of all, if we put σα = 0 in Theorem 3, the result
resembles that of Theorem 1 which was expected. Also, as it
is seen from 3, by increasing M and decreasing ǫ, e1 grows
much faster (quadratic) than e2. So for small enough σα, e1
is probably the bigger value.
Remark 2: In this remark we will show that theorem 2
works in the random case of coverage depth too. Similar to the
steps taken in the Subsection IV-A, the sequencer will receive
qn in SNP position n ∈ [N ] such that
qn =
M−1∑
m=0
(2m + δm,n)Xm,n
+
M−1∑
k=0
(
2k + δ˜k,n
)
Yk,n + Z˜n (76)
9where δm,n and δ˜k,n are normal random variables with zero
mean and variance σ21 . Also, Z˜n ∼ N (0, σ2) where σ2 is
defined in (51). We can write qn as
qn =
M−1∑
m=0
2m(Xm,n + Ym,n) + Zˆn, (77)
where Zˆn ∼ N
(
0, (2M+1 − 2)σ21 + σ2
)
.
From (77) the Markov chain in the proof of Theorem 2 is
valid here as well. Continuing the same steps, we conclude
that Theorem 2 works here. Therefore, all the discussions in
that scenario is still valid here.
Remark 3: All the results driven are for the case of Haploid
cells. In this case, there is one set of chromosomes. But
in the case of Diploid cells, each cell carries two sets of
chromosomes. It means that in every position in the genome,
there are two chromosomes covering it. To extend our results
to the case of Diploid cells, we can assume each individual
contains the chromosomes of two haploid-celled individuals.
So all the results are tailored to the case of Diploid cells if
we replace M with 2M for the M -individual scheme.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE STEPS
In this paper, we introduced the problem of privacy in the
process of DNA sequencing. Previously, the privacy criterion
was inspected in genomic data sets, but their concern of
privacy is very different in comparison to our perspective.
We seek to satisfy privacy in the process of sequencing
that enables to hide the DNA sequence from the sequencing
machine, while letting us to construct the sequence in a local
processor that is trusted. Previous approaches’ concern was
briefly how to make genomic data ready for announcement in
a way that the information of no single individual is violated,
so one can see how our approach is different.
In this paper, we aimed to theoretically define the problem
of privacy in DNA sequencing and introduce an achievable
scheme so that it can satisfy our constraints if parameters
are adjusted correctly. We used non-colluding sequencers and
distributed the genome data between them. Also, we used
the idea of pooled sequencing and combined our the real
data with known sequences. By setting the number of known
sequences and the coverage depth of sequences, we can satisfy
the constraints.
As this is the first paper in this problem, there can be done
a lot in future works. For instance, The case in which a set
of sequencers are collaborating could be concerned, or the
case in which fragments are not limited to contain just one
SNP. Also, the lower bounds in the theorems in this paper can
be improved. At last, we hope this paper has paved the way
towards privacy in the process of sequencing.
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